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Supplemental Forms of Intellectual Property
Protection for Plants*
Mark D. Janis**
I. INTRODUCTION
A new hierarchy of intellectual property protection for
plant innovation is emerging. Utility patent protection is
poised to become the dominant intellectual property
mechanism for plants in the U.S. and perhaps elsewhere.
Plant breeder's rights systems continue to garner a dedicated
following, especially in developing countries, as a means for
complying with international intellectual property treaty
obligations. But while utility patent and plant breeder's rights
regimes have come to occupy the first tier of the intellectual
property hierarchy for plants, other forms of intellectual
property protection remain important, albeit in a supplemental
role. This article surveys supplemental intellectual property
strategies for plants in three areas: trade secrets (Section II);
trademarks and unfair competition (Section III); and post-sale
license restrictions (Section IV).
II. TRADE SECRETS
Trade secret protection has long been used in the seed
industry. In this section, after briefly reviewing the general
legal standards and sources of law for trade secret protection, I
will analyze the leading decision on the use of trade secret
protection to protect germplasm - the Pioneer v. Holden's case,
and then consider some key determinants influencing the
choice between patent protection and trade secret protection for
plant-related innovation.
* This paper was prepared in connection with the ISF (International
Seed Federation) International Seminar on the Protection of Intellectual
Property and Access to Plant Genetic Resources, Berlin, Germany, May 2004.
** Professor of Law and H. Blair & Joan V. White Intellectual Property
Law Scholar, University of Iowa College of Law.
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A. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC STANDARDS
Trade secret protection is possibly the least formalized of
all types of intellectual property protection. It entails no
registration process, nor any official government document
memorializing the existence or subject matter of the protection.
Trade secret protection operates on the theory that (1) a
firm's secret information may have commercial value, and (2)
the law should intervene against competitors who seek to
appropriate that value through improper practices.' This
theory may be understood both as a matter of preserving fair
competition so that competitors do not become unjustly
enriched and as a matter of securing a firm's intangible
property so that a firm will have an incentive to generate
additional valuable information.
The obligation to protect trade secrets is now established
as a matter of international law, through Article 39 of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS).2  Article 39 requires the World Trade
Organization (WTO) members to protect undisclosed
information pursuant to the more general obligation to protect
against unfair competition.3
In general, TRIPS Article 39 leaves WTO members
considerable discretion to shape national law on the details of
trade secret protection. TRIPS Article 39 defines the concept of
trade secret broadly but conventionally, sweeping in all manner
of confidential information that has value as a consequence of
its secrecy, where the owner of the information has taken
reasonable steps to maintain secrecy.4 Article 39 also defines
misappropriation broadly, as encompassing acts that are
"contrary to honest commercial practices." 5
Article 39 also includes one special provision that may be
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a
(1995).
2. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/t-agm0_e.htm (last visited
Oct. 14, 2004).
3. See id. art. 39.1.
4. See id. art. 39.2.
5. Id.; TRIPS footnote 10 lists illustrative acts that may be deemed
contrary to honest commercial practices, including such behavior as breach of
contract, and breach of a confidential relationship. Id. art. 39.2 n.10.
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of future interest to plant biotechnology firms. Article 39.3
requires that WTO members protect trade secrets from
disclosure and commercial use when the secret is required to be
submitted to a government agency for market approval. 6
Currently, the requirement applies only to trade secrets
concerning pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical
products. 7  If nations enact elaborate regulatory approval
schemes for transgenic plants, firms may wish to press for
expansion of Article 39.3's protections.
In the United States, the TRIPS Article 39 obligations are
implemented through state law. While the precise character of
trade secret protection may vary from state to state, many
states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).8
The following general comments reflect the approach followed
in UTSA jurisdictions. 9
First, consistent with the international standard, the
UTSA defines trade secret broadly, to embrace such subject
matter as formulas, compilations of information, techniques,
and processes, where the subject matter derives independent
economic value from it secrecy, and where the subject matter is
the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.10 The
subject matter need not be novel in the patent law sense.1 1
Second, the UTSA defines misappropriation in terms
analogous to those used in TRIPS Article 39. Misappropriation
may occur in a variety of ways - e.g., through breach of a
confidential relationship, or when a trade secret is otherwise
acquired via "improper means."12  Critically, independent
discovery, through analysis of publicly-available information or
through reverse engineering, does not constitute "improper
means," a feature that distinguishes trade secret protection
6. See id. art. 39.3.
7. Id. art. 39.3.
8. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (1985) [hereinafter UTSA], available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1980s/utsa85.htm (last visited Nov.
17, 2004); see also ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS
§1.01[2][a] (2004).
9. I have largely limited these comments to trade secret law in the
United States. For a survey of trade secret law in a European jurisdiction,
see, for example, Jon Lang, The Protection of Commercial Trade Secrets, 25
EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 462 (2003).
10. See UTSA § 1(4) (1985).
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e (1995).
12. See UTSA § 1(2).
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from utility patent protection. 13
Third, trade secret protection is not subject to a fixed term
of protection. Trade secret protection endures as long as the
subject matter remains secret. 14  However, suits for trade
secret misappropriation are likely to be subject to a two- or
three-year statute of limitations (commencing from the time
when the misappropriation was discovered, or would have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence).15
B. LESSONS FROM PIONEER V. HOLDEN
The leading case on the application of trade secret law to
plant germplasm is Pioneer v. Holden.16 The case involved an
assertion of trade secret protection that is considered to be
typical in the seed industry: trade secrets in the identity and
genetics of the inbred parents of a commercially-distributed
hybrid. In particular, Pioneer asserted that it owned a trade
secret in inbred lines (including a line designated H3H) used as
male parents for certain valuable corn hybrids. 17 The court
upheld Pioneer's claim for liability under both trade secret and
unfair competition theories.
Others have written in detail about the complex facts and
principal arguments in the case.' 8 This article will forego a
lengthy discussion and concentrate instead on examining three
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995).
14. In Advanta USA, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., the court
considered whether the issuance of a plant variety protection certificate on a
given variety resulted in disclosure barring any subsequent assertion of trade
secret protection with respect to that variety. No. 04-C-238-S, slip op. (W.D.
Wisc. Oct. 27, 2004) (summarized in Plant Variety Protection Act Does Not
Preempt State Law Trade Secret Action, PAT. TM. & COPYRT. J., Nov. 19, 2004,
at 43). Advanta framed the argument as a preemption argument: whether the
U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act preempted state law trade secret claims.
The court rejected the argument. Id. Indeed, a plant variety certificate need
not be accessible to the public. See Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant
Variety Protection: Sound and Fury...?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 747-48 (2002).
Thus, the court was correct to reject the view that as a matter of law, the
issuance of a plant variety protection certificate would necessarily exterminate
trade secret protection.
15. For a trade secret case in the seed industry in which the statute of
limitations came into issue, see E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto
Co., No. CIV.A. 00-359-SLR, 2001 WL 652019, at *1 (D. Del. 2001).
16. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226
(8th Cir. 1994).
17. Id. at 1229.
18. See, e.g., Debra L. Blair, Intellectual Property Protection and its
Impact on the U.S. Seed Industry, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 297, 308-10 (1999).
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lessons from the case that remain relevant in the current
intellectual property environment.
First, Pioneer v. Holden provides a helpful illustration of
the concept of "reasonable measures" to maintain secrecy, as
applied to the enterprise of plant breeding. For example,
Pioneer had imposed express confidentiality restrictions in
agreements with its contract growers, had forbidden the use of
signage in fields, and had used coded labels on its seed bags. 19
The court concluded that this combination of safeguards
satisfied Pioneer's obligation to undertake reasonable measures
to maintain secrecy. 20
Second, Pioneer v. Holden rejects the proposition that the
possible existence of selfs in a seed bag destroys trade secret
protection.21 The court was satisfied that Pioneer's practices
had greatly limited the prospect that male inbreds would
accidentally appear in bags of hybrid seed.22 Importantly,
however, the court did not resolve the question whether the act
of "chasing the selfs" constitutes proper reverse engineering or
"improper means."23
Third, Pioneer v. Holden delivers a mixed message on the
issue of the difficulty of proving misappropriation in a trade
secret case involving biological subject matter. On the one
hand, on the basis of very close similarity between the Pioneer
and Holden seeds, the court was willing to infer probable
misappropriation, and shift to Holden's the burden of coming
forward with evidence of independent development. 24 On the
other hand, the court cited the peculiar facts of the case as
support for drawing the inference of misappropriation. 25 The
court pointed to allegations of a pattern of behavior by Holden's
involving alleged efforts to discover Pioneer's trade secrets over
a period of years, alleged discarding of information relevant to
the parentage of its own product, and other facts that suggest
that future litigants might find it easy to distinguish Pioneer v.
19. Pioneer, 35 F.3d at 1236.
20. Id. at 1236-37.
21. See id. at 1236.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1238-41.
24. See id. at 1240-41. The burden shift issue continues to be litigated in
trade secret cases in the United States. See Moore v. Kulicke & Soffa Indus.,
Inc., 318 F.3d 561, 573-74 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that when plaintiff presents
evidence of product similarity, the burden of persuasion shifts to the
defendant to come forward with evidence of independent development).
25. See Pioneer, 35 F.3d at 1239-40.
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Holden.26 Moreover, even after according weight to these facts,
the court still found the misappropriation issue to be a close
one, and obviously struggled with the complexity of the
technical evidence. 27
C. PATENTS V. TRADE SECRETS: SOME KEY DETERMINANTS
In view of the general tenor of trade secret protection, and
the specific illustration of trade secret protection applied to the
seed industry in Pioneer v. Holden, what are the factors that
might inform a firm's choice about whether to pursue trade
secret protection (which forbids disclosure), as opposed to
utility patent protection (which requires disclosure and thus
eliminates future claims of trade secret protection for the
disclosed subject matter)? Most observers would expect firms
to favor utility patent protection over trade secret protection in
any usual case. Indeed, when considering whether the federal
patent regime preempted state trade secret law, the U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that trade secret protection was
generally so weak as compared to patent protection that, as a
practical matter, there was little risk that firms would choose
trade secret protection for any given invention if patent
protection was likely available. 28 The relevant question, then,
is whether there are trends in either patent law or trade secret
law that might operate at the margins - for example, making
trade secret protection even marginally more attractive as
compared to utility patent protection.29
Certainly, a number of recent trends in patent law run in
precisely the opposite direction, bolstering utility patents as a
preferred means of protection for plants over trade secrets. In
J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc,30 the U.S.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1239. For more on the complexity of discovery in a germplasm
misappropriation case, see, for example, Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Asgrow
Seed Co., Nos. Civ. 4-98-CV-90577, Civ. 4-98-CV-90578, 2000 WL 33363188, at
*3 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (referring to the prospect that discovery could involve
multiple grow-outs extending over several Midwestern growing seasons and
lamenting the sheer complexity of the case).
28. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-91 (1974).
29. For a general discussion of the topic, see, for example, Andrew
Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret
Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK. OFF.
SoC'Y 371 (2002).
30. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124
(2001).
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Supreme Court upheld the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's
longstanding view that seed-grown plants constituted patent-
eligible subject matter within the meaning of the U.S. utility
patent statute. 31 In Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser,32 the
Canada Supreme Court rejected a grower's argument that
patent infringement could be excused if it was "innocent."
33
Although there is no comparable authoritative decision in the
U.S., U.S. patent infringement law is founded on the premise
that innocent or independent development is not a defense,
whereas independent development is a defense to trade secret
protection. 34 In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling 35 ("McFarling If'),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit confirmed
that utility patent infringement is not subject to a seed-saving
exemption, notwithstanding the existence of such an exemption
under plant breeder's rights schemes such as the U.S. Plant
Variety Protection Act (PVPA).36
A few trends do cut in favor of trade secret protection.
Taken collectively, these trends could result in a reduction in
the value of utility patents, and could make the patent versus
trade secret decision a closer call in some situations. First,
U.S. patent law continues to impose relatively rigorous
standards for patent disclosures in the chemical and
biotechnological arts.37 One of the disclosure requirements,
31. Id. at 145-46.
32. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
33. Id.
34. To put the same point differently, utility patent infringement requires
no showing of copying or derivation. For utility patents on plants, this rule is
most advantageous to patent owners who claim by genotype or phenotype.
Where patent claims are directed to specific varieties, as a practical matter,
the patent claim is likely to be infringed only by someone who physically
appropriates patented seed or plant matter. See Nicholas Seay, Intellectual
Property Rights in Plants, in CSSA SPECIAL PUB. No. 21, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROTECTION OF PLANT MATERIALS 61, 69 (1993).
35. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter McFarling Il]. By the same reasoning, utility patent
infringement in the U.S. would not be subject to a breeder's exemption,
although this does not preclude the possibility that some types of breeding
activity would be deemed to fall within the general, common law experimental
use defense. See Mark D. Janis, Rules v. Standards for Patent Law in the
Plant Sciences (forthcoming 2005).
36. See Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 35 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582
(1994).
37. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle, Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 929
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying the written description requirement to invalidate a
patent claim in a pharmaceutical case).
2004]
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
enablement, 38 has proven to be a significant obstacle to broad
claims to transgenic plants. 39
Second, the U.S. PTO's application of the nonobviousness
requirement is under continual scrutiny in patent policy circles,
especially in current debates, where arguments for more
rigorous application of the requirement are commonplace. 40
The practice of granting of U.S. patents to conventionally-bred
plant varieties, in which the claimed variety is a novel but
predictable outcome of a well-known breeding technique, may
be a candidate for reform if calls for a more robust non-
obviousness standard are heeded.
Third, some patent law doctrines that have been the
subject of recent legislative changes may be due for yet further
reforms. Relatively new U.S. patent rules require that any
pending patent application be published 18 months after its
effective filing date, but patent applicants may opt out of
publication under a variety of circumstances. 41  Future
legislation might restrict or eliminate opt-out opportunities,
potentially prompting some patent applicants to abandon their
applications prior to publication in favor of trade secrecy. 42
Another relatively new U.S. patent rule allows a defense to
infringement for prior users, typically prior users of trade
secrets. 43 Current rules extend the defense only to business
method patents, but future legislation might expand prior user
rights to encompass all technologies.
38. Enablement refers to the requirement that the patentee provide a
disclosure that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2000).
39. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., Ltd., 363 F.3d 1235
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (disclosing transformation of dicots with truncated Bt gene in
late 1980s may not have enabled transformation of all plant cells, including
monocots); Plant Genetic Sys. N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (disclosing transformation of dicots with bar gene in 1980s did
not enable transformation of all plant cells, including monocots); Adang v.
Fischhoff, 286 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (disclosing transformation of tobacco
plants with Bt gene in 1980s does not enable interference count directed to
transformation of tomato plants with Bt gene).
40. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECON., NAT'L. RESEARCH COUNCIL: A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 72-78 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); FEDERAL TRADE
COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4 (2003).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 122.
42. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 40, at
52-53 (discussing the shortcomings of the current regime).
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000) (effective 1999).
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These trends make trade secrecy potentially more
attractive, and thus bear watching. They must be coupled with
considerations of product life cycles, the cost of obtaining
patent protection, and the technical feasibility of reverse
engineering. Overall, it seems likely that trade secrecy will
remain no more than a supplemental option for plant breeders,
and for inventors in many other technology areas as well.
III. TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
In a time when product differentiation is becoming more
important in the seed industry, it seems likely that trademark
and unfair competition laws will become more relevant than
ever before as a supplemental means for protecting goodwill
associated with particular seed products. Interestingly,
trademark protection was one of the earliest forms of plant-
specific intellectual property regimes proposed in the United
States. Legislation proposed in 1906 would have created
special trademark-like protection for plant names. 44  The
proposal failed to become law, perhaps because it purported to
use trademark law as a way to incentivize innovation in plant
breeding, a task better suited for the patent laws. Trademark
and unfair competition laws could provide important incentives
for plant breeding today, but only as a supplement to patent
law, not as a surrogate for it. In this section, I first discuss
general principles of trademark and unfair competition law,
then consider issues relating to the acquisition of registered
trademark rights for seed and plant biotechnology products,
and next look at the enforcement of unfair competition laws
against germplasm misappropriation and other false
representations, focusing on U.S. law.
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAW
The basic premises underlying trademark law are well-
established.4 5 Trademark law seeks to protect the goodwill,
and assurance of consistent quality, that a producer builds up
in a mark through investing in promotion of that mark in
44. See H.R. 13570, 59th Cong. (1906) (authorizing the Registration of the
Names of Horticultural Products and to Protect the Same). For a discussion,
see Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and
Fury...?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 731-33 (2002).
45. In the U.S., the Lanham Act governs trademark and unfair
competition causes of action. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.
2004]
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connection with particular products or services. By granting
producers exclusive rights in the use of marks in connection
with particular products or services, the law provides producers
with security for further investments in maintaining goodwill
and quality, and it ensures that potential new market entrants
will not be able to free-ride on that goodwill by adopting the
same or a confusingly similar mark.46 Trademark law also
seeks to protect consumers by reducing their search costs and
reducing the possibility that consumers will be misled by firms
that attempt to pass off their goods as those of their
competitors.
Trademark and unfair competition laws seek to effectuate
producer and consumer protections in two somewhat different
ways. Under traditional trademark law, the producer gets
weak property rights to exclude newcomers from using
confusingly similar marks on similar products and services.4 7
That is, the focus is on granting property rights, albeit limited
ones, to the producer. Under unfair competition law, the focus
is on the nature of the newcomer's actions. If the newcomer
makes false representations in the marketplace that cause
harm to the established producer, the producer may bring an
unfair competition cause of action, even if the newcomer's false
representations do not interfere with any registered trademark
rights of the producer.48
B. REGISTERED TRADEMARK RIGHTS FOR PLANTS AND PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY
The U.S. trademark law generously defines "trademark" to
encompass both verbal and non-verbal source designations. 49
One of the principal prerequisites for obtaining trademark
protection is that the mark be distinctive. 50 Distinctiveness is a
46. For an overview of these basic themes, see GRAEME B. DINWOODIE &
MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 3-
46 (2004).
47. By "traditional" trademark law, I mean to refer to the core trademark
infringement liability theory, "a likelihood of consumer confusion." Other
theories, such as trademark dilution, arguably give trademark owners much
stronger property rights that are not necessarily limited to the use of the mark
in connection with particular goods and services.
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
49. Id. § 1127.
50. Id. § 1125(c)(1). Marks must also be non-functional, and must meet
requirements for adoption and use under the U.S. system. Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995) (discussing the
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term of art in trademark law meaning, in rough terms, that the
mark does not merely restate the genus to which the products
or services belong.51 Marks can be deemed distinctive because
of their inherent attributes, or because they acquire
distinctiveness through use in the marketplace.5 2
Seed firms have employed trademark protection in many
fairly predictable, and some less predictable, ways. Monsanto
has registered the word mark ROUNDUP READY for seeds
and herbicide-tolerant genes. 53 Pioneer has also registered its
famous logo. Seed companies undoubtedly consider features
such as the combination of color and graphics on seed bags to
constitute distinctive product packaging trade dress. Firms
might employ other strategies as well, such as impregnating a
seed product with a particular distinctive color and claiming
trademark protection in that color as used in connection with
seed products. Under U.S. law, such a claim is viable if the
firm can show that the color has acquired distinctiveness
through use in the marketplace.5 4
A more difficult issue is whether seed companies should be
entitled to assert trademark rights in the names of plant
varieties. The answer as a matter of black-letter law is
straightforward: plant variety designations are deemed generic,
and hence are unprotectable as trademarks. However, the
justifications for this rule are not entirely consonant with
standard trademark law, and deserve close scrutiny.
Plant variety designations are subject to regulations that
do not apply to other product designations. In the U.S., the
Federal Seed Act 55  imposes various "truth-in-labeling"
requirements on seed firms who desire to market seeds in U.S.
commerce. In international law, Article 20 of International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV)56 specifies that plant varieties that are the subject of
functionality doctrine).
51. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976).
52. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-12
(2000).
53. See, e.g., U.S. Tm. Reg. 1,889,104 (ROUNDUP READY for "herbicide-
tolerant genes for use in the production of agricultural seed").
54. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding a
color of a product protectable as a trademark if a secondary meaning can be
shown).
55. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1551-1611 (1939).
56. See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
2004]
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plant breeder's rights must be marketed under an established
"variety denomination."57  Article 20(1)(a) requires that the
designated variety denomination be deemed the generic
designation for the plant variety.58 Other provisions require
that "no rights in the designation registered as the
denomination of the variety shall hamper the free use of the
denomination in connection with the variety, even after
expiration of the breeder's rights,"59 and that any party who
markets propagating material for a protected variety must use
the denomination, even after the expiration of the breeder's
right in that variety.60
These requirements are inconsistent with any assertion of
trademark protection in plant variety denominations.
Genericness is the antithesis of trademark distinctiveness.
Thus, it is not surprising that the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) has taken the position that it will
refuse registration of any word mark for plants or seeds that
"comprises a varietal or cultivar name,"6 1 on grounds of
genericness. 62
The PTO's stance does not appear to have caused grave
practical problems for seed companies. A seed company can
Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89, as amended on Mar. 19,
1991 [hereinafter UPOV], available at http://www.upov.int/en/publicationsl
conventions/199 1/pdf/ act1991.pdf.
57. Id. art. 20.
58. See id. art. 20(1)(a).
59. Id. art. 20(1)(b).
60. See id. art. 20(7).
61. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK
MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1202.12 (2003) [hereinafter TMEP],
available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmep/1200.htm#_Toc2665947; In re Delta
& Pine Land Co., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157, 1159 n.4 (TTAB 1993) (stating
there is "no question" that varietal designations are generic and
unregistrable); In re Hilltop Orchards & Nurseries, Inc., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1034 (TTAB 1979) (affirming the rejection of COMMANDER YORK for apple
tree on the ground that it would be perceived as "common descriptive name" of
the goods); In re Cohn Bodger & Sons Co., 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 345, 346 (TTAB
1959) (concluding that "'BODGER' is the trademark, and 'BLUE LUSTRE' is
the varietal name designating a hybrid petunia of a specific variety and color
rather than a brand-name identifying seeds sold only by applicant and
distinguishing them from seeds sold by others").
62. These decisions precede U.S. accession to UPOV. Indeed, the early
case precedes the creation of UPOV. UPOV compliance cannot have been the
impetus for the U.S. rule. In any event, U.S. cases do not appear to limit the
genericness rule to plant varieties that are the subject of Plant Variety
Protection certificates.
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choose a rather mundane designation (often a combination of
letters and numbers) as the variety denomination, and then
choose a more memorable "fancy" name to accompany the
variety denomination on any product packaging and
advertising. While the company must concede away any
trademark rights in the variety denomination, the company
should still be entitled assert rights in the accompanying fancy
name. The UPOV scheme expressly provides that "[w]hen a
variety is offered for sale or marketed, it shall be permitted to
associate a trademark, trade name or other similar indication
with a registered variety denomination."63 Unfortunately, this
arrangement would seem to invite arguments over what really
constitutes the unprotectable variety denomination as opposed
to the protectable accompanying mark.
The problems with the PTO's position relate, instead, to
the rationales for denying trademark protection. The cases
appear to espouse two rationales: genericness (as already
discussed) and alleged duplicate protection due to a perceived
conflict with patent and plant variety protection (PVP) law. As
discussed further, the rationales are blended in some cases. In
Hilltop, for example, the trademark examiner cited the
applicant's plant patent as "evidence that the goods on which
the mark is used is indeed a variety," supporting the
genericness theory.64 Similarly, the U.S. Trademark Manual of
Examining Procedure instructs trademark examiners that:
Whenever an application is filed to register a mark containing
wording for live plants or agricultural seeds, the examining attorney
must inquire of the applicant whether the term has ever been used as
a varietal name, and whether such name has been used in connection
with a plant patent, a utility patent, or a certificate for plant variety
protection. 65
Viewed purely as a matter of trademark policy, neither
rationale is very compelling.
First, setting aside the UPOV and related truth-in-labeling
requirements for seeds, it is not clear that plant breeders
always use variety denominations as generic references. 66
63. UPOV, supra note 56, art. 20(8).
64. Hilltop, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1035.
65. TMEP, supra note 61, § 1202.12.
66. In other areas, model designations have sometimes been deemed
registrable as trademarks without apparent negative consequences for
competition. See, e.g., In re Petersen Mfg. Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 466, 468
(TTAB 1986) (referring to letter-number combinations for locking hand tools
and stating, "there is no question that such model designations can, through
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Standard trademark law calls for a case-by-case assessment of
genericness. While standard trademark law certainly can be
altered by external rules such as truth-in-labeling
requirements originating from UPOV, such alterations should
be treated as exceptional, and the external rules should be
narrowly construed.
Second, the argument that trademark protection would
conflict with the goals of the patent or PVP regimes is flawed.
In Dixie Rose,67 the court reviewed the Trademark Office's
refusal to register TEXAS CENTENNIAL (and design) for
roses, scions, and cuttings under the 1905 Act, predecessor to
the current U.S. trademark statute. In upholding the refusal,
the court adopted the genericness rationale, but also asserted
that offering trademark protection would give the applicant an
"unfair advantage" because the applicant also had plant patent
protection for the roses.68 According to the court, the applicant
trademark protection would "tend to prolong [the applicant's]
monopoly, beyond the life of [the applicant's] patent, by making
it difficult for a newcomer to break into the field."69 Similarly,
in the CHIEF BEMIDJI case,70 the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (TTAB) 71 asserted that
[A]ny rights which applicant enjoys in the 'CHIEF BEMIDJI' plant
derives from its [plant] patent since others are prohibited from
growing and selling this variety during the life of said patent. To
grant applicant a [trademark] registration of this designation with all
the statutory presumptions accruing therefrom would be inconsistent
with the right which others will have upon the expiration of the
patent not only to grow and sell the plant but also to use 'CHIEF
BEMIDJI' as the varietal name.
72
In support, the TTAB cited the famous "Shredded Wheat" case,
Kellogg Co. v. Nabisco Co. 73
use and promotion, be perceived as marks indicating origin in addition to
functioning as model designations").
67. See Dixie Rose Nursery v. Coe, Comm'r of Patents, 131 F.2d 446 (D.C.
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 782 (1943).
68. See id. at 447.
69. Id.
70. In re Farmer Seed & Nursery Co., 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 231 (TTAB
1963).
71. The TTAB is an administrative body within the U.S. PTO that
receives appeals from applicants who have been refused registration by a
trademark examiner.
72. Farmer, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 232.
73. See id. at 232 (citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111
(1938)).
[Vol. 6:1
PROTECTION FOR PLANTS
But the Kellogg case cannot be fairly read to confer "an
unlimited right to market" a formerly-patented product under a
particular trademark.7 4 More fundamentally, it is simply not
clear that a patent owner enjoys a particular "advantage" in
establishing trademark rights for its products that others
would lack. A patent does not provide its owner any
affirmative right to do anything. It only grants the owner the
right to exclude others from commercially exploiting the
claimed invention. If the patentee itself desires to exploit the
invention, the patentee must invest capital, and if the patentee
desires to associate a particular trademark with the patented
product, the patentee must also invest in building up goodwill,
just as any other mark owner would need to do.
It might be argued that a patent owner seeking to establish
trademark rights still has an advantage over others: he or she
need not invest in building up goodwill at the same level as
others because competitors are precluded by the patent from
producing the patented product under a different mark. But
this argument begs for empirical evaluation. Some trademark
owners do not have close competitors even in the absence of
patents, yet we certainly do not use the absence of competitors
as an excuse to take away their trademark rights.
Additionally, some trademark owners who do have patents may
have to invest more in securing their trademark rights - the
existence of the patent might actually be disadvantageous -
because of the risk that consumers will come to consider the
firm's trademark as the generic reference to the goods, since
the firm is the only marketer of the goods.
In any event, loose rhetoric about overlaps between
intellectual property regimes is particularly dangerous in the
seed industry, where a multiplicity of intellectual property
regimes may be invoked for any given product.7 5 Even if the
trademark rules do not present immediate practical concerns
for the seed industry, the industry should challenge the use of
flawed rationales concerning conflicts among intellectual
property regimes, lest those rationales be applied by analogy to
74. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Kellogg Co. v. Nabisco Co., in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW STORIES (forthcoming 2005) (noting that the
Court granted defendant the right to copy only on the condition that the
defendant identify its product so that consumers could distinguish it from the
plaintiffs).
75. I develop this point in more detail in Mark D. Janis, Interface
Measures and Collision Norms for Intellectual Property (forthcoming).
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other intellectual property interfaces, such as that between the
utility patent and plant breeder's rights regimes.
76
C. UNFAIR COMPETITION PROTECTION AGAINST GERMPLASM
MISAPPROPRIATION
Unfair competition law is another supplemental
mechanism for protecting intellectual assets associated with
plant breeding technology. Unfair competition claims might be
relevant in cases of germplasm misappropriation, brown bag
sales, and other false representations about seed products.
Unfair competition law is a standard component of modern
intellectual property systems. It is an established principle of
international intellectual property law,77 and is implemented
domestically in a variety of ways. The Lanham Act section
43(a)78 is the principal basis for federal unfair competition
claims. In its usual manifestations, section 43(a) is similar to a
trademark infringement cause of action, except that a section
43(a) action does not require any registered trademark rights,
and theoretically contemplates a broader array of unfair
commercial practices than technical trademark infringement -
practices that may include a variety of false representations
about one's own or another's products or services. 79
76. For a slightly different, but still sympathetic, argument, see Stanley
D. Schlosser, The Registration of Plant Variety Denominations, 29 IDEA 177
(1988). Schlosser argues that when the patent or plant breeder's certificate
expires, competitors should be free "to commercialize the formerly protected
variety" but the competitor "is not automatically free, however, to utilize the
patent owner's trademark in his marketing"; this instead should be a matter
for case-by-case adjudication on the merits of the trademark claim. Id. at 184.
Schlosser also asserts that the relationship between trademark rights and
variety denominations should be left to national law, and that the relevant
UPOV provision on variety denominations (now Article 20) should be
eliminated. Id. at 188-89. For a contrary view, taking the position that
trademark law should be amended to make explicit the prohibition against
trademark protection for variety denominations, see Paul van der Kooij, Is
Something Rotten in the Member States, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 189
(2000). Van der Kooij would extend this prohibition to all variety
denominations, irrespective of whether the variety has been the subject of a
plant breeder's certificate. Id.
77. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar.
20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, art. lObis, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
79. The language of the statute amply supports a broad conception of
unfair competition:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
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Courts adjudicating unfair competition cases in the U.S.
have sometimes employed the labels "passing off' and "reverse
passing off' to designate two separate categories of unfair
competition claims.8 0 Suppose that a local seed producer places
its own, low-quality seeds in bags that use the same distinctive
color scheme, graphics, and perhaps use even the same brand
as a multinational seed company. The local seed producer has
probably violated section 43(a) by attempting to "pass off' its
own product as that of the multinational. This is a mundane
type of violation in unfair competition law, wherein a producer
simply misrepresents its own products as a competitor's.
By contrast, suppose that the local seed producer
appropriates another seed company's germplasm by
unauthorized means and produces seed. The local producer
then sells the seed under its own label (without, of course, any
acknowledgment of its actual origin). This is the passing off
scenario in reverse: the local producer is now trying to pass off
another's product as the product of the local producer. That is,
a producer is misrepresenting someone else's products as his
own.
In theory, a section 43(a) reverse passing off cause of action
should be valuable as a supplemental intellectual property
mechanism for use against misleading commercial practices in
the seed industry. As applied to cases involving the
misappropriation of germplasm, a section 43(a) reverse passing
off claim could serve as an alternative claim to a trade secret
misappropriation claim. Indeed, a reverse passing off claim
succeeded in the Pioneer v. Holden case.8 1 A reverse passing off
claim might be more attractive than a trade secret claim in
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which--
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
80. See, e.g., Creeden v. Infosoft, Inc., 326 F.Supp.2d 876 (N.D. Ill. 2004);
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir.
1994).
81. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l., 35 F.3d at 1241-42.
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that reverse passing off is a federal claim, requires no showing
of secrecy, and may call for less complex proofs than those
necessary to show trade secret misappropriation. 82
Similarly, a section 43(a) reverse passing off action could
theoretically be brought against parties who save a firm's seed
and sell it via "brown-bag" sales. United States plant variety
protection law already proscribes brown-bag selling of saved
PVP-protected seed. 83 However, if the subject seed does not
enjoy PVP protection, or the certificate is invalid or expired, the
proscription does not apply.84 In such circumstances, a seed
firm could conceivably rely on a section 43(a) reverse passing
off action. 85 Under section 43(a) law, behavior of this type has
been designated "implied" reverse passing off - that is, the act
of "removing or obliterating the name of the source and then
selling the product in an unbranded state."86
While these features would seem to signify that section
43(a) reverse passing off actions are to be taken seriously as
vehicles for IP protection, section 43(a) actions are also subject
to important limitations. The scope of injunctive relief in a
section 43(a) case - and in most other Lanham Act cases - is
likely to be more limited than the injunctive relief that might
issue in a utility patent or PVP case. The remedy in a section
43(a) case is designed to address the consequences of the false
representation. Ordinarily the remedy is aimed simply at
alleviating consumer confusion. 87 This means that even if a
firm prevails in a section 43(a) action, the injunction may not,
as a practical matter, prevent the enjoined competitor from
marketing the product at issue. The competitor might, for
example, include disclaimers on the label and thereby proceed
free of the injunction.
82. For example, in a reverse passing off case, it might be sufficient to
prove that the germplasm did not originate with the local producer, without
proving exact parentage, whereas ideally more direct evidence of
misappropriation would be offered in a trade secret case.
83. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000).
84. Id. § 2541.
85. There is no time limit on §43(a) actions, although in cases of
unreasonable delay in commencing the action, § 43(a) might be limited by the
equitable doctrine of laches.
86. Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir.
1998).
87. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
LAW § 30.3 (2004) (collecting authorities on a variety of limitations to the
scope of injunctions in trademark and unfair competition cases).
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In addition, some in the U.S. are questioning the viability
of section 43(a) reverse passing off claims in the wake of the
U.S. Supreme Court's Dastar decision.8 8  Dastar was
distributing a videotape set on World War II that it had created
by copying and editing the tapes of an old television series.8 9
The series in turn was based on a book.90 Neither Dastar's
packaging, nor its screen credits on the videotapes, made any
reference to the television series or the book. 91 Fox produced a
competing set of videotapes based on the same television series
and sued to enjoin Dastar.92 Fox had owned the television
series copyright but failed to renew it, so its only copyright
claim was a possible claim as licensee of the copyright in the
underlying book.93 Instead of relying solely on copyright law,
Fox also asserted a section 43(a) reverse passing off claim, on
the grounds that Dastar's packaging misrepresented the
videotapes as originating with Dastar, when in fact the
underlying creative content of the videotapes was attributable
to the producers of the television series and book.94 The lower
courts accepted Dastar's theory, but the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected it. 95 According to the Supreme Court, if a party
produces a product, the party can represent that the product
originates with it without violating section 43(a), even if
someone else was responsible for the underlying creative
content.96
Dastar cannot properly be read to have eliminated the
section 43(a) reverse passing off cause of action altogether. The
Court's opinion acknowledges that "every Circuit to consider
the issue found section 43(a) broad enough to encompass
reverse passing off' and concludes that the "language [of
section 43(a)] is amply inclusive . . . of reverse passing off - if
indeed it does not implicitly adopt the unanimous court of
appeals jurisprudence on that subject."97
88. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23
(2003).
89. Id. at 26.
90. Id. at 25-26.
91. Id. at 27.
92. Id. at 26-27.
93. Id. at 27.
94. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27.
95. Id. at 27-28, 38.
96. Id. at 37-38. The Court relied in part on a narrow construction of the
term "origin" in § 43(a).
97. Id. at 30.
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Moreover, the Court's opinion indicates that it intended to
endorse claims of reverse passing off where the defendant has
done nothing more than literally repackage the plaintiffs
goods.98 The Court opined that Fox's claim against Dastar
"would undoubtedly be sustained" if Dastar had simply bought
Fox's videotapes and replaced the Fox packaging with Dastar
packaging.99 Presumably this means that if a firm buys another
company's seeds and simply pours them into a different bag
and resells them, Dastar would not preclude a section 43(a)
reverse passing off claim. 100
Would Dastar preclude a section 43(a) reverse passing off
claim against brown bag sales of saved seed? The brown bag
seller would undoubtedly argue that he is not misrepresenting
the "origin" of the goods because he produced the physical seeds
that are being sold, even though the combination of valuable
traits embodied in the seeds is the result of someone else's
breeding program. The same argument would presumably be
raised against a reverse passing off claim for misappropriation
of germplasm, one of the theories in the Pioneer v. Holden case.
A court in either case would need to determine whether to limit
Dastar to its factual setting - in particular, whether to limit
Dastar to cases involving unfair competition claims that seek to
circumvent the limitations of copyright law. The perceived
conflict between trademark law and copyright law animates the
Dastar rule, but the Court's opinion also contains remarks that
could be used to extend the rule beyond the
trademark/copyright interface. In Pioneer v. Syngenta, 0 the
court invoked Dastar in analyzing a germplasm
misappropriation allegation. Pioneer alleged that Syngenta
98. Id. at 31.
99. Id. Instead, Dastar had produced its tapes by copying from the
master tapes of the television series. One may question whether the
distinction between this behavior, and merely buying and repackaging tapes,
is significant, given that the result is the same from the consumer's
perspective. For a more thorough assessment and critique of Dastar, see
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Revitalizing Unfair Competition Law
(forthcoming).
100. For a post-Dastar ruling that is consistent with this position, see
Carroll v. Kahn, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1357, 1361 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing
Dastar for the proposition that if plaintiff claims that defendant merely
repackaged the product at issue - a movie - as its own, plaintiff states a claim,
whereas if plaintiff claims that defendant failed to give attribution to plaintiff,
plaintiffs claim is barred).
101. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 4:02-cv-90541 (S.D.
Iowa filed Aug. 17, 2004).
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had misappropriated Pioneer seed corn germplasm and used it
in a Syngenta breeding program. Among other theories,
Pioneer asserted section 43(a) passing reverse passing off.
When the Supreme Court decided Dastar, Syngenta moved to
dismiss the reverse passing off claim, asserting that Dastar
foreclosed relief. With little discussion, 10 2 the court agreed.
Pioneer v. Syngenta also discusses another important post-
Dastar issue. A separate provision in section 43(a) governs
causes of action for false advertising. 10 3 The Court in Dastar
noted that a false advertising claim might serve as a viable
alternative to reverse passing off.1 04 It should be relatively
easy of plaintiffs to reformulate their reverse passing off claims
as false advertising claims as a temporary strategy for evading
the limitations of Dastar.10 5
Currently, there is no indication that European unfair
competition law would countenance a restrictive rule like the
rule of Dastar. In particular, there is no reason to expect that
European unfair competition law will adopt the cramped notion
that false representations about "origin" are only actionable if
they are false representations about the origin of the actual
physical product. Accordingly, unfair competition as a remedy
for germplasm misappropriation in Europe should remain a
viable supplement to other IP mechanisms. 10 6
IV. POST-SALE CONTRACT RESTRICTIONS
A discussion of supplemental forms of intellectual property
protection for plants would be incomplete without an
examination of the role of intellectual property license
restrictions on breeding, resale, and other activities. In
particular, two broad classes of post-sale contract restrictions
are familiar in the seed industry. First, license provisions
might restrict a grower's use of purchased seed, prohibiting
seed saving and replanting, and prohibiting resale outside the
102. Pioneer apparently conceded that Dastar precluded relief.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000).
104. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 38
(2003).
105. In Pioneer v. Syngenta, Pioneer was faced with the more difficult task
of persuading the court that the reverse passing off claim actually stated a
claim for false advertising. The court rejected this argument.
106. For an authoritative synthesis of European notions of unfair
competition law, see INTERNATIONAL BUREAU, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO PUB NO. 725(E), PROTECTION AGAINST
UNFAIR COMPETITION (1994).
20041
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol.6:1
authorized distribution channels. 107  Second, license
restrictions might prohibit or limit breeding activities,
including using a protected variety in a breeding program,
and/or subjecting a protected variety (e.g., a trade secret-
protected variety) to reverse engineering.108
The law of post-sale intellectual property contract
restrictions invokes rules that are external to intellectual
property altogether, as well as rules that are internal to it, but
reside at the peripheries of its jurisprudence. The area is
complex and volatile. Whether post-sale contract restrictions
in an intellectual property license are enforceable generally
may be understood as a matter of whether the restriction at
issue conflicts with any of four sets of rules: (1) intellectual
property rules on "exhaustion by sale"; (2) antitrust
(competition) law rules; (3) general rules of contract
enforcement; and (4) preemption rules (in particular, any rules
that govern the interfaces between intellectual property
regimes). In this section, I briefly sketch out some of the issues
and rules arising under each of these categories, as those issues
have arisen under U.S. law.
107. Examples include Monsanto's technology agreement for growers who
purchase ROUNDUP READY& seed and Pioneer's bag tag restrictions
appearing on its bags of hybrid seed corn. The Monsanto technology
agreement litigated in McFarling I required that purchased seed be used "for
planting a commercial crop only in a single season," and required that the
grower not "save any crop produced from [Monsanto's patented] seed for
replanting, or supply saved seeds to anyone for replanting." Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter McFarling 1].
One of the Pioneer bag tag licenses, litigated in the Ottawa case, included the
following language:
One or more of the parental lines used in producing this product are
proprietary to Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. ("Pioneer").
Parental lines are U.S. Protected Varieties and may be protected
under the laws of other countries; export or transfer of possession is
prohibited. Pioneer intends to supply only hybrid seed. Customer
agrees that it is not acquiring the rights to use any parental line for
any purpose other than production of forage or grain for feeding or
processing. If the tag indicated this product is produced under one or
more U.S. patents, customer is licensed thereunder only to produce
forage or grain for feeding or processing. All uses outside the U.S. are
prohibited to the extent they result in infringement of U.S. patents.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018,
1025 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (emphasis in original).
108. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. DeKalb genetics Corp., 51
U.S.P.Q. 1987 (S.D. Iowa 1999) (enforcing "bag tag" prohibiting purchasers of
PVP-protected corn seed from using the seed for breeding or research
purposes).
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A. EXHAUSTION BY SALE
U.S. utility patent law, like the law of most intellectual
property regimes, includes a principle that is variously called
"exhaustion by sale," the "implied license," or, less often in
patent law but more frequently in other areas of intellectual
property, the "first sale" doctrine. Under this principle, when a
customer purchases a patented product in an authorized sale,
the customer is deemed to have received an implied patent
license along with the physical product to use and dispose of
the product in ordinary ways. 109 The patent owner's patent
rights are "exhausted" in the specific physical product that is
the subject of the sale; the authorized "first sale" of the product
from the patent owner to the customer triggers the
exhaustion. 110 The rule may be understood as a reflection of
the probable intentions of the patent owner and customer: the
patent owner sets a price, and the customer is willing to pay
the price, on the understanding that the purchaser will use the
patented product for its ordinary purposes. Because such use
would require a patent license, the patent owner's price must
be understood to incorporate a patent license fee.
A threshold issue concerning exhaustion rules is whether
the principle of exhaustion overrides express conditions that a
patent owner may place on a sale of a patented good. In other
words, the principle of exhaustion could, in theory, be viewed as
an absolute rule, or merely as a default rule that a patentee can
override by using express contract terms.
U.S. courts have treated patent exhaustion as a default
rule that a patentee can override with express contract
restrictions,"' a sensible result if the exhaustion principle is
treated as a consequence of an implied license reflecting the
probable intention of the parties. When a patentee adds
express conditions to a sale of a patented product, the
purchaser presumably pays a lower price as a result.
This issue has arisen in litigation over the application of
patent exhaustion principles to seed bag tags. In Pioneer v.
109. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000) (detailing "first sale" rights as they
apply to sound recordings).
110. See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
111. See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F.3d at 1105 ("The unrestricted sale of
a patented article, by or with the authority of the patentee, 'exhausts' the
patentee's right to control further sale and use of that article by enforcing the
patent under which it was first sold.") (emphasis added).
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Ottawa, Ottawa sought to invoke patent exhaustion, but the
seed bag tag at issue imposed express restrictions that were
inconsistent with Ottawa's claim of exhaustion. 112 The court
held that the bag tag provisions operated as conditions on the
sale of seed that overrode the general principle of exhaustion. 1 3
Stated another way, only an unrestricted "first sale" triggers
exhaustion. This ruling is consistent with the prevailing law.
A more difficult issue concerning the application of
exhaustion principles to the plant breeding industry is how
exhaustion should apply to self-replicating products. 1 4 The
question arose in Monsanto v. McFarling,115 (McFarling 1) in
which Monsanto sought to enforce patents on ROUNDUP
READY8 soybeans against a grower who had saved and
replanted seed.116 The grower argued, in effect, that when he
purchased Monsanto seeds, Monsanto's patent rights were
exhausted not only in the purchased seeds, but also in
subsequent generations of seeds harvested from crops that
were grown from the purchased seeds. 1 7
The grower had purchased the seeds subject to Monsanto's
technology agreement, which expressly forbade seed saving and
replanting.118 Reviewing the argument on appeal, the Federal
Circuit could have concluded that the express conditions in the
technology agreement governed over any contrary principles of
exhaustion. Instead, the court took a more formalistic tack,
pointing out that the patents included claims to the seed, not
just the plant, and concluding that because there was never
any authorized sale of the saved and replanted seed,
exhaustion could not have been triggered as to the saved and
replanted seed.11 9 In any event, the decision demonstrates that
intellectual property exhaustion rules do not present a serious
obstacle to standard post-sale restrictions in seed contracts.
112. Pioneer v. Ottawa, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-32.
113. Id. at 1033.
114. For an early article analyzing this issue, see Scott A. Chambers,
Exhaustion Doctrine in Biotechnology, 35 IDEA 289 (1995).
115. McFarling I, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
116. Id. at 1293-94.
117. Id. at 1298.
118. Id. at 1293.
119. Id. at 1299 ('The original sale of the seeds did not confer a license to
construct new seeds, and since the new seeds were not sold by the patentee
they entailed no principle of patent exhaustion."); see also Monsanto Co. v.
Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941-942 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (adopting the approach
of McFarling Ion the exhaustion issue without further analysis).
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B. ANTITRUST/COMPETITION LAW
Post-sale contract restrictions in intellectual property
licenses may raise competition concerns. While intellectual
property licensing is pro-competitive in many circumstances,
competition authorities have historically expressed concerns
that intellectual property owners may use licenses as leverage
to obtain market advantages exceeding those that the
intellectual property laws contemplate. 20 In general, under
the doctrine of patent misuse in the U.S., post-sale license
restrictions will be rendered unenforceable where: (1) through
the license restriction, the patentee has broadened the scope of
the patent beyond its expected and ordinary scope; and, (2) the
anti-competitive effects of the broadening outweigh the pro-
competitive benefits under application of the rule of reason. 12 1
Some types of licensing restrictions are deemed per se to
broaden patent scope with net anti-competitive effect - for
example, post-expiration royalty provisions. 122 Other types of
licensing restrictions are ordinarily upheld under this
framework - for example, field-of-use restrictions. 123
U.S. courts have now begun to apply this framework to
various post-sale restrictions in seed licenses, upholding the
challenged restrictions in cases decided to date. 124 In Pioneer v.
Ottawa, involving Pioneer's bag tag restriction against resale of
patented seed, the court reasoned that a utility patent confers
absolute rights to exclude others from using and selling, so a
license restriction against resale of patented seed is an
assertion of part of the package of exclusive rights, not an
attempt to broaden the scope of those rights. 125 Accordingly,
the court upheld the bag tag restriction as a matter of law - the
court saw no need even to reach second part of the framework
(the rule of reason question).
120. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.2b
(2002) (stating that misuse occurs when the patent owner broadens the patent
with anticompetitive effect).
121. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(upholding a single-use restriction). Post-sale restrictions might also be
challenged affirmatively as violating the standards of the Sherman Act.
122. Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 815 (1998).
123. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F.
Supp. 2d 1018, 1045 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
124. See generally id.
125. See id. at 1045-46.
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In McFarling I, McFarling challenged Monsanto's seed-
saving prohibition in its technology agreement as an
anticompetitive tying arrangement. Specifically, McFarling
argued that Monsanto tied the purchase of its patented seed to
purchases of second generation seed. 126 In the context of patent
license transactions, tying is a strategy for extending the scope
of the patent grant by conditioning the grant of a license on the
licensee's purchase of additional, unpatented materials. 127
Tying is only impermissible under certain conditions: for
example, the proponent of the tying allegation must show that
the licensor applied actual coercion (forcing the licensee to
accept the tied product as a condition of licensing the tying
product), and that the licensor possesses market power
sufficient to carry out the alleged coercion. 128
In McFarling I, the Federal Circuit took the view that
there was no likelihood of success on the tying allegation based
on a preliminary record because even though the seed saving
restriction had the effect of forcing the grower to buy a fresh set
of seeds for each new planting, the restriction did not force the
grower to buy that fresh set of seeds from Monsanto, as
opposed to buying them from one of Monsanto's competitors. 129
In McFarling II,130 the court arrived at the same outcome,
albeit via a slightly different analysis. Monsanto sought to
characterize the seed-saving prohibition as a field-of-use
limitation, a type of contract provision that routinely survives
scrutiny under a rule of reason analysis.' 31 The court resisted
that characterization, reasoning that the grower engages in the
same use of the purchased seed whether or not the grower
intends to save and replant the second generation of seed. 132
Accordingly, the Monsanto technology agreement did not
impose a restriction on the use of the licensed product per se;
instead, it imposed a restriction on the use of goods "made by"
126. See McFarling 1, 302 F.3d 1291, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002). McFarling also
apparently advanced an alternative argument that the restriction illegally tied
the natural soybean product and the patented genetic trait.
127. See id.
128. See HOVENKAMP, JANIS, & LEMLEY, supra note 120, at 21 (giving a
precise rendering of the necessary elements of proof and a detailed discussion
of relevant authorities).
129. See McFarling I, 302 F.3d at 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
130. See McFarling II, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (on appeal from a
summary judgment that followed preliminary injunction proceedings).
131. See id. at 1342.
132. See id.
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the licensed product. 133 The court considered this distinction
immaterial because the patent claim to seed would encompass
the second generation seed as it would the first. However, the
court left open the possibility that a different rule might be
appropriate for different circumstances.134
In sum, cases to date have demonstrated no trend towards
heightened competition law scrutiny of post-sale restriction
clauses in seed contracts in the United States. Undoubtedly,
such contracts will continue to be the subject of litigation in the
U.S. and elsewhere.
C. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
As litigants become convinced that courts will carefully
circumscribe patent law and competition law challenges to the
enforceability of typical seed contract provisions, litigants will
begin to explore other avenues of relief, including general
contract law. A full exploration of this issue is beyond the
scope of this article, but guidelines are emerging in U.S. case
law and legislation that address whether a standard label
license will be treated as a binding contract. Under the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the terms in a label license
can become part of a binding contract between "merchants" (a
term that would include seed firms and growers) if the licensee
fails to object within a reasonable time.135 However, the UCC
also provides that terms that "materially alter" the bargain
between the parties does not become part of the contract. 136
In the context of seed contracts, courts have resolved the
tension between these two rules by holding that where the
potential licensee (e.g., the grower who receives the seed bag)
has knowledge of the bag tag license and fails to object within a
reasonable time, the license is enforceable. 37 Importantly,
courts have also concluded that there need not be a direct
showing of actual notification. The requisite knowledge on the
part of the licensee can be inferred from announcements in
general trade journals and the like. 138
133. See id. at 1342-1343.
134. See id.
135. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c) (2004).
136. See id. § 2(b).
137. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F.
Supp. 2d 1018, 1047-48 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (citing Monsanto v. Scruggs, 249 F.
Supp. 2d 746 (N.D. Miss. 2001)).
138. See id at 1047.
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The contract law relating to seed licenses is only in its
infancy in the U.S. Many state legislatures are enacting
legislation specifically tailored to regulate contracts between
seed firms and growers. Litigation over foundational contract
matters such as those discussed here, and over new state
legislation, should be expected to increase substantially over
the next several years.
D. PREEMPTION ISSUES
Finally, post-sale contract restrictions may raise questions
that I will characterize as questions of "preemption." Suppose
that a provision in a patent license agreement conflicts with a
statutory provision existing in a plant breeder's rights statute.
Should a court conclude that the provision in the plant
breeder's rights statute overrides (preempts) the patent license
restriction? More generally, should a court engraft limitations
from one intellectual property regime onto another regime?
I will only attempt to answer that question here in
connection with two specific scenarios. In the first, suppose
that the contract restriction precludes seed saving and
replanting of seed patented in the U.S., and the preemption
argument is founded on the existence of the statutory seed
saving provision in the U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act.
In McFarling I and II, the Federal Circuit held that patent
holders can enforce seed saving prohibitions in patent license
agreements. 139 The statutory limitation on PVP rights allowing
seed saving is just that: a limitation on rights conferred under
the PVP regime. It cannot "impart the right to save seed of
plants patented" under the utility patent statute, as the
Federal Circuit put it.140 A limitation on intellectual property
rights in one regime cannot confer a "right" that applies to limit
rights acquired under other intellectual property regimes.
4 1
In a second scenario, suppose that a contract restriction
precludes reverse engineering of trade secrets embodied in seed
that is sold to a customer. Here, one preemption issue is
139. See generally McFarling I, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002); McFarling
II, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
140. McFarling I, 302 F.3d at 1299.
141. The same general principle should apply to the PVP breeder's
exemption. That is, the PVPA does not impart a "right" to breeders to conduct
commercial research on patented plant varieties; it only creates a limitation
on PVP rights. A claim that a patent license restriction on breeding research
"violates" the PVPA should be rejected.
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whether the PVP research exemption preempts such a contract
provision. In Pioneer v. DeKalb,142 the court appeared to reject
such an argument, although the court cannot be considered to
have decided the issue squarely because the seed at issue was
not protected by a PVP certificate. 143 The same reasoning that
was used in McFarling should also apply to this preemption
argument. It is likely that this debate will be driven by
litigation on shrinkwrap licenses under software copyrights. 144
In sum, cases decided to date have suggested that seed
firms in the U.S. have considerable latitude to employ contract
provisions to draft around limitations in intellectual property
regimes. Future cases may clarify the precise scope of that
latitude.
V. CONCLUSION
Intellectual property protection that supplements patent
and plant breeder's protection will continue to be important in
the seed industry. Trade secret protection has historically been
an important mechanism for protecting the identity and
genetics of inbreds, but in the future, utility patent protection
is likely to be considered more attractive in most cases.
Trademark and unfair competition protection are likely to
become more important as the industry continues its shift
towards differentiated seed products. Limitations on
trademark protection for variety denominations are important
to the extent that the rationales for those limitations spill over
to other debates about overlapping intellectual property
protection for plants. Limitations on unfair competition actions
in the U.S. arising from the Dastar decision call for further
elucidation. Finally, seed firms have succeeded in litigation so
far in the U.S. over the enforceability of post-sale contract
restrictions, though this case law has only begun to develop.
142. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d(BNA) 1797 (S.D. Iowa 1999) (holding that Pioneer's claim for relief survives a
motion to dismiss).
143. See id. at 1800.
144. See Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (holding that the U.S. Copyright Act did not preempt a shrinkwrap
licensing agreement that prohibited reverse engineering).
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